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Academic Freedom and Political
Neutrality in Law Schools:
An Essay on Structure and Ideology in
Professional Education
J. Peter Byrne
Academic freedom in law schools? One might question the necessity of
assembling so much talent to address an issue so little fretted over or even
raised. To toiling lawyers harassed by noisome clients, pinched revenues, and
haughty authorities, law professors lead lives of wide liberty, researching
topics of their own choice and expressing their own views, not merely making
arguments tailored to secure client interests. To academic colleagues pinched
by the penury of the humanities or in thrall to the labyrinthine bureaucracy of
the sciences, law professors feast on wealth and autonomy, their minor mental
exertions (tenured professors who have not written books!) reaping scholarly
eminence and, even more unforgivable, the attention of government and
media. Why would legal academics, who enjoy the very best of the richest
academic culture in the world, worry about academic freedom?
We law professors should begin by acknowledging the clover in which we
cavort. Indeed, we do not fear external threats to our freedom to publish,
speak, or teach as we see fit. Neither government directives nor market
pressures uncomfortably constrain our autonomy. No McCarthy suspiciously
searches for heresies; no judges, legislators, or bar officials demand painful reform. Even in a deep economic recession thousands of bright college graduates clamor to study under us. Nor need we even interest grants
boards in our research projects: to write we need only chair, word processor,
and library.
If legal scholars fear neither censorship nor constraint from beyond the
academy, they may worry about confusion of purpose and method within, an
erosion of tacit consensus that might promote insipid scholarship or permit
bumbling, even well-intentioned collegial censorship. If there is peril today, it
is that of prosperity; if threat, it is internal. Reflecting on academic freedom in
legal education may enrich our understanding of these nagging concerns.
Academic freedom signifies the university's insistence that each professor's
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work be evaluated only by appropriate scholarly standards, so that valuable
knowledge may be distinguished from prejudice and interest. To examine
the character of academic freedom in the law schools, we must consider
the disciplinary structures and normative foundations of these interesting
institutions.
My topic for this essay is the role of institutional political neutrality in
fostering a vital academic freedom within a law school. It is necessary to
explain what this inquiry embraces and why it is a useful entry into our
concerns. Traditionally, the political neutrality of the university has been seen
as the foundation for the academic freedom of the professoriate. But the
media today vibrate with complaints about "political correctness" in legal
education, meaning an administrative sponsorship of certain social ideals in a
manner that restricts criticism or debate.1 Also, political contention over the
shape of legal education has been seen as corrupting faculty hiring and
promotion. Given these concerns, it is helpful to consider the nature of the
political neutrality that supports academic freedom and consider the extent to
which it appropriately applies to legal education today. I take up these difficult
questions not with the hope of escaping criticism, but in the hope that
forthright debate about the purposes and procedures of legal education will
genuinely illuminate our position and options.
This essay does not discuss constitutional or statutory law, except where
such discussion explains underlying concerns. Legal regulation lies lightly
upon law schools; legal rights need rarely be invoked. 2 We need more to
stimulate conversation among members of our own legal academic community, where rhetorical recourse should be to shared norms and circumstances,
rather than to amassed authorities for unnecessary legal defenses.
To explain my focus requires brief summary of traditional understandings
about academic freedom that arose in the development of social science
departments in America and have been fostered by the American Association
of University Professors. This I undertake in Part I of the essay, which develops
into a comparison of the structures and beliefs of strictly academic disciplines
and those of professional schools. I hope to explain why academic freedom in
practice flourishes in law schools but always seems to be under internal threat.
This part concludes with the suggestion that legal education needs a more
concrete understanding of academic freedom adapted to its own circumstances. At this point it becomes possible to suggest the significance and limits
of political neutrality in legal education.
Part II seeks to build on the prior discussion to examine more carefully the
obligations that professionalism imposes on legal education. To some extent,
1.

See, e.g., Nat Hentoff, 'Politically Correct' atNYU Law, Wash. Post, Nov. 3,1990, atA23; Lino
A. Graglia, Race Norming in Law School Admissions, 42J. Legal Educ. 97 (1992).

2.

One curious about cases in which disgruntled students or others have unsuccessfully sought
to prosecute litigation against law schools might examine, for example, Harvard Law School
Coalition for Civil Rights v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 595 N.E.2d 316 (Mass.
1992) (dismissing suit by students alleging discrimination in faculty hiring for lack of
standing); Easley v. University of Mich. Bd. of Regents, 627 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich. 1986)
(rejecting due process claims).
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acceptance of professional duties for legal education may ameliorate confusion about the intellectual context, but it can also foment divisive friction. At
this point I reconsider the only real scholarly examination of academic freedom in legal education that has penetrated thejournals in the last decade: the
debate surrounding Paul Carrington's strictures on "nihilism."
Part III turns to the integration of clinical legal education into the moral
fabric of academic freedom. Here I hope to harvest some fruit from prior
discussion about professional duties for legal education. I take up criticisms of
a "leftist bias" in client selection at law school clinics leveled by the Washington Legal Foundation, a self-consciously conservative legal endowment. This
discussion may help explain how retention of some workable norm of political
neutrality remains essential to the success of legal education.
I. Legal Scholarship and Political Neutrality
Academic freedom provides both functional and aspirational norms for the
university. It reflects both the premises of transnational scholarship and the
peculiar mores and anxieties of American life. Academic freedom always
remains enmeshed in the changing fortunes of higher education in the larger
society,3 yet its meaning cannot be exhausted in contingency and pragmatism.
It maintains our connection with an ideal academy where disinterested scholars pursue living knowledge with rigor and grace.
In an earlier essay, I described the development of academic freedom as an
effective norm during the emergence of modern research universities from
the 1870s through the Progressive period.' I argued that professors obtained
freedom from nonprofessional evaluation of scholarship and teaching on the
basis of a broad consensus about the "scientific" and apolitical basis of knowledge and the replacement of religion by a more materialistic conception of
social welfare as the ideological foundation for political support of higher
education. I also argued that professorial proselytizing established academic
freedom as an organizational norm protecting scholarship and teaching from
threats within institutions-largely without positive legal protection. Academic freedom protected by the First Amendment emerged (in the 1950s and
1960s) to protect the traditional institutional autonomy of universities from
government control, when government sought to turn higher education to
more narrow, short-term political and economic benefits.
Some brief allusion to these theses about the character of academic freedom generally is required to highlight the special position of law schools. For
our purposes, only two points need to be emphasized. First, the ideological
appeal of academic freedom as a norm distinct to the university has depended
on a view of the scholar as employing in good faith methodologies sanctioned
by his discipline to separate knowledge from prejudice; interference by lay
3. "Definitions of academic freedom have developed in response to actual historical circumstances." David M. Rabban, A Functional Analysis of "Individual" and "Institutional"
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, Law & Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, at
227, 229.
4.

Academic Freedom: A "Special Concern of the FirstAmendment," 99 Yale LJ. 251 (1989).
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trustees or attorneys general threatens the suppression of knowledge by
ignorant orthodoxy.' Second, claims for institutional autonomy invoke the
moral appeal of intellectual training in these disciplines and in the cultural
legacies of world civilizations: the university is conceived as a world apart from
the cash nexus, where young adults can mature into rounded citizens of poise
and independent judgment while maintaining their "character" despite the
seductions of market society.6 That university life often fails to resemble these
ideals has not destroyed their power to shape expectations and moderate
behavior. So long as people perceive them to express a core of truth and an
enduring potential, we shall have academic freedom in its traditional form;
should they be abandoned as shams, higher education will change rapidly in
directions we cannot predict.
The political neutrality of the university played an integral part in these
traditional understandings of academic freedom. It has been thought that an
individual scholar's political commitments may obstruct her search for truth,
which requires perspective and objectivity. Much worse, since lay trustees
formally establish institutional policies, institutional political commitments
will reflect the prejudices of ignorant laymen and can only impinge on
scholarly peer review. At the same time, these institutional commitments
undermine the college's separate mission to foster learning and judgment;
they draw the college into the world of interests and mobilization. For those
reasons, professors demanded that their institutions hold no political views, so
they themselves could freely pursue their inquiries without fear of reprisal.
Again, any academic will recognize how inadequately this vision encompasses all the motives and compromises of our universities. But it may be even
more striking how much influence the vision still exercises over the conduct
of higher education. For example, the United States distributes billions of
dollars to fund university research each year. While the subjects chosen to be
investigated properly reflect public priorities, such as control of the HIV virus
or improvements in conductivity, the procedures employed by granting agencies, such as the National Institutes of Health and the National Science
Foundation, exist to hold politicians' preferences at far remove. Also, these
agencies have demanded that researchers adhere to traditional norms of
scholarly disinterestedness.7 To an impressive extent, policies shaping new,
expensive, and potentially revolutionary investigations adapt traditional academic values to quite new settings. Even in my law school, the Department of
5.

6.
7.

The locus classicus of this view is the General Report of the Committee on Academic Freedom
and Tenure, I A.A.U.P. Bull. 15 (1915). The 1915 Statement is analyzed at some length in
Byrne, supra note 4, at 276-79. See also Richard Hofstadter & Walter P. Metzger, The
Development of Academic Freedom in the United States 468-90 (NewYork, 1955); Walter P.
Metzger, The 1940 Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure, Law &
Contemp. Probs., Summer 1990, at 3.
For detailed debate about the significance of institutional autonomy for academic freedom,
see Rabban, supra note 3; Byrne, supra note 4, at 311-39.
See, e.g., Responsibility of PHS Awardee and Applicant Institutions for Dealing with and
Reporting Possible Misconduct in Science, 54 Fed. Reg. 32,449 (1989) (codified at 42 C.F.R.
Part 50, SubpartA); see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Academic Freedom and Academic Values
in Sponsored Research, 66 Tex. L. Rev. 1363 (1988).
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Education in a Republican administration funded a massive effort to reformulate first-year legal education along lines that encourage more trenchant
criticisms of the status quo, yet this point hardly merits mention.
Legal education developed along institutional and ideological lines quite
distinct in important aspects from those of more strictly intellectual disciplines. The gist of the difference lies in the role of legal education in equipping students for active professional lives as lawyers. I believe that the connection of university legal education to a powerful, organized profession affects
significantly the shape and role of its academic freedom. I wish now to explore
the particulars of professional education and suggest how they render problematic the traditional academic ideal of political neutrality. We will see that
law professors have relatively weak claims to exclusive criteria for peer review,
and that inescapable commitments to the legal profession compromise
institutional autonomy. The challenge for legal educators is to articulate a
positive norm of academic freedom despite these departures from archetypical structures.
The desirability of university professional instruction in law became apparent long before there was much sense about how law professors should write
or teach. Unlike departments of economics, history, or biology, law schools
found a home in the university before they had any consensual methodology
for identifying knowledge. The establishment of social science departments in
the last quarter of the nineteenth century depended crucially on widespread
enthusiasm among intellectuals about the application of scientific methods to
broad areas of human concern. Although pioneer university legal educators,
such as Dean Langdell, adopted the jargon of science to justify the inclusion
of law within the university,' the engine for inclusion appears to have been the
aspirations of the organized bar for a better educated, more elite profession. 9
University legal education was based on the need to qualify for admission to
state bars and cemented by the hiring criteria of elite law firms.
In this context, law professors have had to be credible educators rather
than pioneering scholars. The first purely academic lawyer, James Barr Ames,
appointed in 1873, combined classroom mastery of the case method with

8.

Langdell's best-known aphorism is: "Iflaw be not a science, a university will consult its own
dignity in declining to teach it." Speech (Nov. 5, 1886), reprintedin 3 Law Q. Rev. 123, 124
(1887).
Of course, there have been numerous efforts to refound legal scholarship on properly
scientific grounds, culminating, perhaps, in the empirical research of the legal realists. See
Laura Kalman, Legal Realism at Yale, 1927-60 (Chapel Hill, 1986). From our vantage, these
efforts have a somewhat zany yet pathetic aspect. Scientific aspirations persist in the law and
economics movement, of course, but this has undermined the validity of law as a separate
discipline. The best-known recent article on empirical research in legal scholarship seeks to
explain its absence. Peter H. Schuck, Why Don't Law Professors Do More Empirical Research? 39J. Legal Educ. 323 (1989). Contemporary legal scholars often can be characterized
as intelligent conduits of the insights of other fields to problems that vex the legal system.

9.

See Robert Stevens, Law School: Legal Education in America from the 1850s to the 1980s, at
20-34 (Chapel Hill, 1983); see generally BurtonJ. Bledstein, The Culture of Professionalism:
The Middle Class and the Development of Higher Education in America (New York, 1976)
(American universities typically developed from professional aspirations).
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historical essays restricted to distilling common law rules from ancient cases.'0
Since then most successful law professors have varied the content but not the
structure of Ames's achievement, combining classroom magnetism with intelligent scholarship of doubtful value." Law professors to this day typically do
not earn a separate research degree in law, such as a Ph.D., but enter teaching
only with the basic professional degree required of all lawyers.
There has always been a discontinuity between the "success" of legal education, whether measured in terms of number or quality of students and faculty
or of public esteem, and the rather marginal character of legal scholarship,
spanning a twilight landscape between the concerns of intellectuals and those
of practicing lawyers. Worse than that, many of our students lack interest in
legal scholarship, viewing the study of law as an expedient means to career
goals. Our status as gatekeepers to a lucrative and powerful profession condemns us to teach bright students who have little sympathy for scholarly
endeavor. Yet their relentless march fills school coffers with that which ensures our affluence and subsidizes an intellectual life of conferences and
papers that rarely address the concerns of our patrons.
If one accepts that the production of scholarship has not been the chief
function of law schools, what follows for academic freedom? First, we lack
essential methodologies around which we can build consensus about what
constitutes outstanding legal scholarship. Equally serious and intelligent professors can disagree utterly about the value or thoughtfulness of a book or
article; the disagreement can grow bitter because all of legal academia may
seem at issue. This can lead to fearsome disputes about hiring, promotion,
and tenure, in which opponents doubt each other's good faith about academic freedom. Methodological disputes divide other disciplines, of course,
but legal scholars seem less determined to resolve them internally by purely
intellectual criteria. In this law schools most closely resemble literature departments, where internal disputes about methodology collaterally raise controversy about the claims of professors to privileged expertise in, for example,
evaluating novels. 2 Many nonacademic lawyers doubt that professors understand law better than they do.
Second, the politicization engendered by this lack of a disciplinary core is
exacerbated by the subject of our writing. Whatever its methodology, most
successful legal scholarship explains how and why current law fails and how it
can be improved; clarification and taxonomy, while valued, rarely suffice. The
legal scholar must invoke and defend norms ofjustice or efficiency and apply
10. See, e.g., The Disseisin of Chattels, 3 Harv. L. Rev. 23 (1889); The History of Assumpsit, 2
Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1888).
11. See Paul D. Carrington, Butterfly Effects: The Possibilities of Law Teaching in a Democracy,
41 Duke LJ.741, 787-88 (1992). Each law professor cherishes a small list of heroes and
heroines who have risen above the average in brilliance of scholarship, inspiration of
teaching, or contributions to law reform.
12. A much debated example is the pamphlet of the American Council of Learned Societies,
Speaking for the Humanities (New York, 1989), where arguments for "critical theory" and
the privileged position of scholarly over lay readings of literature are persistently entwined.
SeeJohn Gross, The Man of Letters in a Closed Shop, Times Lit. Supp., Nov. 15, 1991, at 15;
John Searle, The Storm over the University, N.Y. Rev. Books, Dec. 6, 1990, at 34.
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them to contentious issues of legal and social conflict. Often these norms
seem inextricably bound with the writer's scholarly methodology. Debate
about the intellectual value of a methodology, such as originalism in constitutional interpretation, cannot be neatly severed from political contention, such
as that about the legitimacy of a constitutional right to abortion. Again,
other disciplines share this conflation, but the consistent focus of legal scholarship on better laws ensures a unique influx of partisan passion into legal
scholarship.
Third, unlike, say, English departments, law schools are rich. Students jam
our halls, without ever weighing the value of legal scholarship. Wealth often
saves schools from embittering choices: the pie grows, and all views can be
accommodated. Moreover, law professors enjoy immensely pleasant professional lives, in which thirty-two weeks of fifteen to twenty hours of teaching,
preparation, and grading garner the material support for engaging in esteemed scholarly and public service pursuits. All law professors share an
interest in keeping such rewarding institutions afloat; radical reform proposals usually go no further than to give Wall Street-bound graduates guilty
consciences. Innumerable legal journals, devoid of peer review, publish every
jotting of every professor every year. Discontented professors can shift fairly
easily to other legal employment, an option unavailable to sour philosophers.
While the intellectual ambiguity of law school makes every appointment or
promotion issue a potential civil war, material abundance ensures that bloodshed rarely occurs.
Fourth, law schools enjoy a peculiar institutional autonomy. Viewed from
one perspective, they have less autonomy than traditional academic departments, because of the historical partnership with the organized bar. Law
schools are accredited by the American Bar Association, whose concerns are
professional rather than scholarly; the ABA sets minimum standards for
education and prescribes a small part of the curriculum. And state bar examiners exert powerful, albeit indirect, influence on law school curricula. Viewed
from a different perspective, however, law schools enjoy unusual autonomy.
Because they are net profit centers within most universities, law schools often
enjoy relative freedom from central administration control. Law professors
can ignore public research needs because they seldom need outside funding
for their research. And the accrediting officials and state bar boards take no
interest in the substance of legal scholarship. The sum of these influences
appears to be that law school instruction must meet some professional criteria
but that scholarly agendas can be formed without regard to any substantial
external constraint.
But what instruction can we draw from these observations about the practice of academic freedom in law schools? Foundational methodology cannot
greatly ease the difficulty for law faculties in making personnel decisions solely
on the basis of professional competence, with no improper political bias.
Because we often lack a common language for discussion, we may fail to
understand or trust each other's motives or procedures. In such a setting, peer
review, the institutional bulwark of academic freedom, may not be adequate
to channel judgment in appropriate directions. We may not have sufficient
confidence to leave ourselves alone with ourselves.
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The problem of political neutrality in the law school is not so much a
problem of reactionary trustees or left-leaning state legislatures as it is a
problem of the faculty's seeking to replicate itself. The battlegrounds are
hiring and tenure. The combatants are faculty, though sometimes with crucial
interventions by students, alumni, or central administration; deans and committee chairs do not so much constrain faculty choice as function as levers for
its exercise. Nearly all participants view themselves as acting in service to truth
and decency; very few would acknowledge distinctly political motivations.
Though few clear injustices occur, risk abounds.
Despite the absence of organizing or validating methodologies, good legal
scholarship of all schools displays intellectual virtues that merit the protection
of academic freedom. These virtues manifest the desire to extricate truth from
prejudice and constitute the operational means by which discourse within the
legal academy may be rendered worthwhile. Any legal scholar must demonstrate knowledge of the primary statutes and judicial decisions applicable to
her problem and consider how legal officials might enforce those laws in a
particular situation. The careful attribution of authority permits readers to
judge how fairly or intelligently the writer has interpreted relevant legal or
scholarly sources. Any legal scholar will be expected to treat a chosen subject
in depth and to set forth and defend the premises from which she begins, the
steps of reasoning, and the scope and consequences of her conclusion. Technical jargon must be suppressed, or be used consistently. Contrary arguments
should be answered rather than ridiculed or ignored.
None of these virtues guarantees the "truth" of the writer's analysis or
conclusions, but adherence to them facilitates scholarly debate and permits
revision in light of additional arguments and perspectives. Participation in
these conversations may engender the sense, however difficult tojustify philosophically, that careful and open thought is providing a richer, useful, more
substantial, and, in a broad sense, "truer" portrait of the problem and its
possible "solutions." Because depicting legal problems and devising legal
instruments to address them presupposes some irreducible normative orientation, analytic legal closure never is complete.
But the contribution of these virtues of legal scholarship to truthful depiction can be highlighted by comparing them to the devices of advocacy in a
professional lawyer's product. An appellate brief, too, depends upon a number of complex normative assumptions that facilitate engagement between
appellant and appellee, such as the understanding that an advocate may not
fabricate authority to support his position. But the skillful brief writer will
suppress complexity in favor of a specious clarity; all authority will be interpreted to support the client's position; the goal is persuasion rather than
understanding. Of course, a legal scholar may hope to influence legal outcomes that benefit groups or interests, but to have standing as scholarship her
work must contribute to the understanding of those who are indifferent to her
groups or interests.
Can legal scholars adhere to a morality of mutual evaluation that will foster
academic freedom despite the absence of a central methodology? At a minimum, legal scholars must resist a spiral down into entrenched combat among
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competing political factions. When such struggle becomes an end in itself, the
virtues that permit intellectual life disappear: reflection, skeptical regard for
the views of colleagues, and scrupulous honesty. Such an eruption does not
differ in consequence from political persecution from without, except that it
may not so assuredly rally professorial solidarity behind the banner of free
scholarship.
Law schools must remain politically neutral in this sense, that faculty must
not seek to eliminate a method of analysis from institutional discourse because of concern with its political tendency. Each faculty member has a moral
duty in personnel decisions, for example, to suppress personal political antipathy when considering the scholarly merits or potential of a candidate.
Professors who become concerned that a colleague is not dealing with personnel issues on the merits serve their ideals of free scholarship best by acting
upon them, not by descending to counterinsurgency. Clear and persistent
efforts to subvert peer review merit institutional sanctions, including loss of
tenure, but only through open accusation and fair hearing.
It also seems mistaken to act as if each variation of every school of thought
has a right to be heard within every law school. Modern universities thrive on
bureaucratic accommodation of intellectual conflict, multiplying positions,
departments, buildings. Our properly relativist standards for free speech in
the society at large might suggest that academic freedom should shield from
adverse judgment all tender shoots of individual expression.
Law schools, indeed, have indulged this attitude to some extent during the
expansions of the seventies and eighties, but this growth may not be sustainable. Nor perhaps should it be. Collective judgment remains the distinguishing characteristic of organized scholarship. Has not our lassitude, our lack of
intellectual identity, been aggravated by a failure to engage across methodologies, to argue trenchantly-as those responsible for the intellectual life of the
law-how we should imagine it? Upon mature consideration, a faculty can
conclude that game theory need not be applied to child custody or anthropology to secured transactions. These judgments may be wrong, but acting upon
them in good faith and defending them provide focus to the collective
exertions of scholars. 3 Suchjudgments do not offend academic freedom; they
13. I am far less comfortable about the consonance of academic freedom with a law school's
decision to employ only professors who pursue a particular methodology, such as economic
analysis. Obviously, if the school anoints the methodology because of its political tendency,
such a standard must be condemned emphatically. Where the school establishes the methodology because of a sincere belief that it represents a qualitatively superior understanding of
the legal system, the question is more difficult. I support qualitativejudgments by the faculty,
and the aggregation of such judgments will tend toward reproducing what most faculty value
most highly, resulting in different concentrations of scholarly emphasis among schools. But
an institutional rule directing employment from only one camp forestalls this evolving and
changeable faculty judgment. A faculty cannot effectively debate the value of a methodology
when the school employs only those who affirm its worth. Such a rule privileges one method
among many that compete, but, as I have stressed, law lacks any consensual criteria by which
such a choice can be conclusively justified. Moreover, individual scholars either within or
seeking employment at such an institution must experience greater than usual pressure to
conform to the prevailing orthodoxy.
No commitment to professional training, such as those examined below, independently
justifies the single-method school. Enrolling students are unlikely to appreciate the signifi-
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give it vitality.
Obviously, I have put us in a dilemma. I have warned against the enhanced
dangers for law professors who judge legal scholarship on political grounds,
and I have insisted on the necessity for judging scholarship and pruning
relatively sickly growths. No methodological orthodoxy can guarantee us
salvation. No new layer of expert administrators can choose for us. We must
make our judgments as best we can. Being aware of the political sirens that
surround us, we must exert our moral intelligence to appraise work solely on
scholarly grounds, by its penetration, comprehensiveness, creativity, and utility. If we exercise poor judgment, our field will decline in intellectual significance. But if we exercise our judgment in good faith to the best of our ability,
we will have satisfied the demands of academic freedom.' 5 For legal scholars,
this may be the normative aspect of living in a "pluralist universe."
Though living by these principles may be difficult, academic lawyers have
traditions and training that provide surprising strengths for the task. First,
American lawyers are steeped in a legal system that is remarkably heterogeneous, in which authority is divided and divided again, and no one worries
very much about how sensibly the pieces fit together. Legal education and
practice remain case-centered; attempts to describe any relation among cases
remain idiosyncratic; formal legal reasoning elicits ridicule; even our statutes
reflect ad hoc political coalitions, eluding codification and mocking canons of
interpretation. American lawyers are accustomed to the incommensurable
and can avoid calling it chaos. Second, the adversary system breeds an acceptance of conflict as inevitable, containable, and resolvable only by compromise or fallible judgment. Similarly, lawyers understand that effective advocacy requires brinkmanship with the truth. Third, of all people, lawyers are
least likely to idealize human nature or be shocked by taint; the perjurer may
now speak truth and the paragon humbug. We should recognize that these
paradoxical virtues of legal culture contribute to a hard tolerance and enduring skepticism that nurture our messy academic freedom.
Legal scholarship recalls the mores of rather old-fashioned liberal arts
colleges. Specialization of subject matter or methodology remains far from
complete among most legal scholars. We are expected to navigate through the
universe of legal problems as much by the exercise of individual tact and
judgment as by the expert wielding of universal methodology. Exercises in
special methodology retain a homemade flavor that preserves their accessibility. A scholar like Richard Posner owes his celebrity in part to the relative

cance of such exclusivity even if the school conscientiously has disclosed its orientation.
Moreover, graduates may be unprepared for practice in a legal world where many colleagues
and decision-makers may be ignorant of or hostile to the methodology in which the graduate
was trained.
14. What is often debilitating in our practice is that these judgments are made only over the
backs of live candidates in hiring and promotion decisions. Faculties need to find mechanisms to discuss these issues on the plane of principle rather than as submerged elements in
personnel decisions.
15. See American Association of University Professors, Some Observations on Ideology, Competence, and Faculty Selection, Academe,Jan.-Feb. 1986, at la.
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simplicity of his conceptions, which allow others without formal training to
embark upon economic analysis; scholars like Mitchell Polinsky who enjoy
advanced training continue to present their work in a form that can be
approached by the nonspecialist. Candidates for hiring and promotion who
enjoy technical facility in other fields must be voted upon by colleagues who
cannot pretend to mastery of the candidates' fields. The absence of special
training for legal academics and the resistance to departmentalization within
law schools preserve the humane flavor of earlier collegiate education. We
should see that this is a strength for our academic community as well as a risk
of prejudice.
So far, I have held my focus on the evaluation of junior by senior law
professors as the area of legal education where academic freedom is threatened with subversion. I have considered why the risks of political corruption
present themselves so forcefully in law schools and why the traditional antidote of methodological competence provides only marginal assistance. I have
argued that law professors must become so intellectually cosmopolitan that
they can judge new intellectual moves with mature consideration and without
recourse to political commitments. Thus, I have reached the modest observation that political neutrality in law school stands less for the type of exclusion
of layjudgment emphasized in traditional accounts of academic freedom than
for an aspiration toward intellectual sophistication and equipoise on behalf of
the faculty members.
One might object that my account portrays legal education as some pleasant tea party that has value only for its participants, or that I have slighted the
dangers from law school administrators. Both these issues require more consideration, which may fruitfully be given in a separate section examining the
relationship between the type of political neutrality I have prescribed for the
faculty and the social mission of law schools.
I. Institutional Goals and Political Neutrality
To this point, we have considered primarily the nature of political neutrality as it pertains to the academic freedom obligation of professors themselves.
I hope I have justified this priority to you by stressing the exceptional autonomy of law faculty from outside control and the vulnerability to political
passion inherent in the multiplicity of criteria for what constitutes good legal
scholarship. But now I want to consider institutional influences that may
assume political dimensions. Perhaps we have underestimatedt the capacity for
institutional priorities to constrain the autonomy of faculty; perhaps that
capacity could be exercised beneficially to enhance the social responsibility of
the law professor. These issues are seasonable given the widespread anxiety
about "political correctness" that lingers in our law schools, and I hope to
address that problem after saying something about weightier concerns.
The only recent, published debate about academic freedom in legal education concerned Paul D. Carrington's "OfLaw and the River." 6 Most of you will

16. 34J. Legal Educ. 222 (1984).

-
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recall that Carrington concluded an essay about the empowerment of aspiring
lawyers with the suggestion that "legal nihilists" voluntarily should leave law
schools for more strictly academic university departments. This suggestion
elicited a storm of protest, particularly from those who read Garrington to be
attacking the academic legitimacy of critical legal studies, then still an insurgent movement in legal education.1 7 Surely, the fierce edge of that debate has
been blunted by time: GLS has become an established (I almost said establishment) school ofjurisprudence, the objections to which have been thoroughly
rehearsed. Perhaps I may be permitted to rake among the embers of that
debate, because issues were raised there about the peculiar obligations of law
schools that seem to me to have contining significance. In brief, the questions
may be phrased as whether law schools must be committed to certain values
incident to their role in preparing future lawyers and whether any such
commitment would breach the academic freedom obligation to political
neutrality.
Carrington argued that professional competence in law requires intellectual courage in the face of uncertainty, which courage cannot flower without
the lawyer's believing to some extent that law and legal institutions do restrain
the exercise of power. Carrington expressed concern about scholars who
maintained that the apparent neutrality of the law merely cozened the poor
and the dispossessed into accepting the justice of their suppression: 'Teaching cynicism may, and perhaps probably does [sic], result in the learning of
the skills of corruption: bribery and intimidation." He urged that nihilists had
an ethical obligation to leave law schools for departments that did not have a
commitment to effective professional training. He dismissed the inevitable
complaints that his approach impinged on academic freedom by arguing that
when "the university accepted responsibility for training professionals, it also
accepted a duty to constrain teaching that knowingly dispirits students or
disables them from doing the work for which they are trained." 8 It is this last
assertion that I find most pregnant and that I will examine closely in a
moment.
Much of the response to Garrington's essay disputed his characterization of
critical legal scholars, the understood targets of his criticisms. Although somewhat self-serving, these objections seem to me well-taken: Carrington abstracted one strand from a complex web of arguments and based his prediction of corruption on the logical consequences of such a doctrine, without
weighing the mass of actual experience that belies his concern. 9 Perhaps
some of you disagree with this assessment, but permit me to pass on to the view
of the law school that Carrington posits.

17. See "Of Law and the River," and of Nihilism and Academic Freedom, 35 J. Legal Educ. 1
(1985).
18. Carrington, supra note 16, at 227.
19. These include the moral optimism of much CLS writing, the number of practicing lawyers of
the highest ethical standards who have studied with CLS advocates, and the number of
unethical Iawyers who have not.
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In critique, Paul Brest denied any distinction between law schools and
other parts of the university, and retorted: "I do not think that principles of
academic freedom apply with less breadth or force to professional schools
than to other parts of the university."" Owen Fiss made a slightly broader
argument:
Law professors are not paid to train lawyers, but to study the law and to
teach their students what they happen to discover. The law school.., is an
integral part of the university, and by virtue of that membership2 1and all the
commitments it entails must be pure in its academic obligations.
In response, Carrington both defended his evaluation of the moral tendency
of CLS writings and insisted that law schools "are not pure in their academic
22
obligations," but bear the primary function of training lawyers.
The gripping and difficult issue Carrington raised is whether law schools
have assumed a moral commitment to the professional training of lawyers that
properly may qualify the meaning of academic freedom. I want to offer some
thoughts on this question, which lies at the heart of the concerns that prompted
this symposium. We must also evaluate whether any such moral commitment
violates the political neutrality that we sought to define in the previous
section. This inquiry is not prompted by animus toward any school of legal
thinkers but only by reflection on the peculiar structure of legal education.
Perhaps it is best to begin by considering the objections offered to Carrington's
suggestion.
Those professors who promptly affirmed the full measure of academic
freedom in law schools seemed more concerned to discourage Carrington
than to explain their thinking. Several lines of thinking can be abstracted,
however. First, one may insist that a law school conform to the prevailing
understandings of academic freedom because it is an integral part of the
university.3 This is undoubtedly true to a very large degree both as a normative and as a descriptive proposition. But Carrington took this proposition as
his general premise and asked only whether the professional dimension might
offer some limit at the margin. Academic freedom cannot have the same
application within every school and department, because it is based on a
particular model of scholarship understood as scientific inquiry. While a
university fine arts program should be conducted on the basis of academic
freedom, it has never been obvious how an ethos of a detached search for
truth applies to studio instruction in sculpture. One cannot stipulate what the
spirit of academic freedom requires in a law school until one has weighed
more critically what happens there.
Second, one may assert at this point that legal scholarship and teaching do
conform substantially to the scientific model upon which academic freedom is

20.
21.
22.
23.

35J. Legal Educ. at 17.
Id. at 26.
Id. at 25.
E.g., id. at 16 (Paul Brest).
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based. Professor Fiss argued that legal scholars "seek to discover the truth"
and "teach their students what they happen to discover." 24 He draped legal
academia with the rhetoric of science. But it is worth considering the extent to
which this is true. Can legal scholars determine, as Fiss suggests, whether law
exists? Plainly not, in the sense that investigators can be adequately certain
from available evidence that the Holocaust occurred or that carbon emissions
deplete atmospheric ozone. Lawyers lack a consensual method for answering
such questions; some other discipline, perhaps sociology, might be able to
answer the question to the satisfaction of its adherents, but would necessarily
eliminate from the inquiry most of what lawyers care about in arguing it.
Indeed, academic lawyers get far more benefit from arguing what the question
means than from progressing toward any solution to the problems that it
suckles. Nonetheless, as suggested above, honest and learned debate about
the meanings of the existence of law does hold out the promise of an en25
hanced, more truthful understanding about the nature of the legal system. I
will return to this slippery point.
Third, some commentators seem to have grasped the bloody flag of academic freedom less from conviction than from anxiety that maintenance of
anything less than the full creed would leave law schools defenseless against
political coercion and acrimony.26 In contrast to the arguments for the
sciencelike quality of legal scholarship, this position may underestimate its
truth value or fear mutual lack of credibility among legal scholars. Though
rarely expressed as such, this view has been widely persuasive. Because mutual
tolerance must be secured to permit any valuable scholarship, academic
freedom must be embraced regardless of its ambiguous applicability to professional schools. Indeed, from this perspective, its ambiguity is an advantage.
Every scholar wishes for a rule of scholarly autonomy that is overinclusive, and
the costs of such a rule will be decried only by students or the public.
All these views seem to slight the distinctive features of legal education. Our
lecture halls are flooded with bright students not because we are imparting a
compelling intellectual tradition or methodology, but because they are avenues toward a professional life where students hope they can combine
fortune, engagement, independence, and public service. Faculty offices are
filled with those who excelled in law school and concluded that the advantages of professional life are more certainly secured as teachers than as
practicing lawyers. The stream of professional students generates the economic means to create a gigantic national legal professoriate from whose
intellectual efforts society demands little, for their scholarship is not indispensable to their function. It is childish to forget that law schools can subsist
happily on student tuition to a degree impossible in nearly every other subject.
The opportunity to argue about whether law exists is more compensation for
grading Property blue books than the performance of a social duty. Teaching

24. Id.at 24, 26.
25. This I take to be the rejoinder of Dean Calabresi. Id. at 23-24.
26. I may be quite wrong, but I think that Paul Brest's responses evince this anxiety. Id. at 16-17.
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law school would be unbearably puerile without the intellectual challenge and
gravity of scholarship.
This position of privilege imposes moral obligations on legal educators. We
must equip our students for the intellectually and morally strenuous professional life that lies before them. This, of course, involves the traditional
initiation into thinking like a lawyer, but it also requires initiation into organizing ideas about law and the broader society that provide the contexts
within which legal rules are forged and applied. Much of this curriculum has
come to resemble a kind of applied liberal arts, in which the interplay between
legal problems and techniques is considered in relation to persistent inquiries
about justice or wealth, with the students encouraged to develop their own
capacities to evaluate central questions. An indispensable feature of such
education is bringing home to students the inevitability of moral choice in
lawyering and some suggestion of the means for choosing. This requires more
than sharing with students the gleanings from our personal research; it
requires serious and sustained foundational pedagogy, such as Professor Fiss
himself no doubt imparts. Effective and inspirational teaching must be taken
more seriously in the law school than in other departments, because our
privileges can be justified only by our success in preparing our students for
professional life.

27

Law professors also bear obligations to society greater than those of scholars in purer disciplines. We have been given the niche from which to observe
the legal system without being beholden to competing interest groups or
clients. Surely we should devote effort to public education about the legal
system, such as through expert testimony, journalism, or media appearances,
to law reform, or to representation of unrepresented persons or viewpoints.
Professional ethical obligations attach to academic as well as to practicing
lawyers. What responsibility schools should take to encourage or demand pro
bono activities (other than scholarship) is a delicate issue which I am not
prepared to address today. But it does seem that the adoption of a mandatory
pro bono rule for faculty should not be considered to violate the academic
freedom of a law professor, although there is a strong argument that a similar
requirement imposed on philosophers would violate their rights.
Does the attribution to law professors of professional obligations breach a
bar on political neutrality by imposing an ideological context on legal academics? This is not a question to which only one answer is possible. Many will
see my suggestions as an abridgement of purely intellectual criteria for faculty
appointment, as they are in principle. Some will see any abridgement as
necessarily an entering wedge of political ideology, and a few will see my

27. Law professors cannot avoid, of course, conveying normative ideas about the function and
role of the lawyer in society, even if unconsciously. See Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Can a Law

Teacher Avoid Teaching Legal Ethics? 41 J. Legal Educ. 3 (1991). When unconscious and
unexamined, such teaching may convey "moral relativism tending toward nihilism, a pragmatism tending toward an amoral instrumentalism, a realism tending toward cynicism, an
individualism tending toward atomism, and a faith in reason and democracy tending toward
mere credulity and idolatry." Roger C. Cramton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School

Classroom, 29J. Legal Educ. 247, 262 (1978).
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inclinations as forcing faculty to prop up the existing edifice of professional
privilege by tepid reformism.
There are two responses to such concerns. First, an obligation to serve or
engage does not presuppose any particular ideological tendency to such
service, any more than a requirement to write dictates the political tendency
of such writing. 8 Similarly, an obligation to teach effectively need not entail a
sectarian notion of effectiveness.
Second, a law school does necessarily embody some vague ideological
commitments that may be binding on its faculty. Law schools surely affirm that
the legal profession and the institutions it dominates ought to serve "the
public interest," that existing laws should be improved, and that individual
lawyers ought to be competent and ethical. Although these nostrums may give
new meaning to indeterminacy, they nonetheless provide a cultural parameter to legal education. A professor who actively opposed them-who, unlike
Carrington's bogey crits, did in fact argue that the only valid purpose of the
legal system was to make lawyers rich, that questioning the perfection of
existing laws was blasphemous, or that lawyers should bribe officials whenever
it serves their clients' interests-would be treated like a biologist who asserted
that moonbeams give birth to living organisms. Such professors may be
condemned as incompetent, but we should concede that their incompetence
lies in advancing views that undermine the social purposes law schools exist to
serve, perhaps in a manner analogous to a scientist who denies the meaning of
testing hypotheses by experiment. Professional schools take on social as well as
intellectual responsibilities by assuming the role of training people to practice
an existing profession.
An obvious danger here is that the academic freedom of a professor to
argue a substantive position may be attacked as unsuitable for a professor in a
professional school. This was what respondents feared was the tendency of
Carrington's misplaced attack on critical legal scholars. This would involve a
deplorable loss: scholars must always remain free to question in a professionally responsible manner any existing orthodoxy. How can this line be marked
to prevent death from friendly fire? Any professional book or article must be
absolutely privileged from questioning on the grounds of professional tendencies (rather than quality of the scholarship); this is a line of clarity in aid of

28. This observation suggests a fresh viewpoint on the much debated issue whether academic
freedom protects a professor's speech in the political marketplace, out of a scholarly context,
against university recrimination. AAUP statements and rules have protected such speech if
uttered in a professionally appropriate manner. William Van Alstyne argued some time ago
that while such speech is protected by the general speech norms of the First Amendment, it
is not protected by academic freedom because it is unrelated to the professor's or the
school's mission. The Specific Theory of Academic Freedom and the General Issue of Civil
Liberty, in The Concept of Academic Freedom, ed. Edmund L. Pincoffs, 59 (Austin, 1972).
Subsequent commentators, including me, have followed this argument.
Yet, if one subscribes to the view that law professors should speak to the general public as a
service to society, it may make sense that academic freedom should protect such public
utterances. The professor's speech advances the ethical obligation of the professor and the
academic mission of the professional school. Such speech in the role of professor might still
be distinguished from overtly political speech by the same person in a nonacademic role.
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an indispensable norm. At the same time, a law school may insist that teaching, at least in core classes, equip and empower students for the futures they
face. For example, a law school may balance the range of methodological
views that first-year students will be exposed in assigned classes. And a law
professor who employs racist humor in class or one who condemns as racist
every view with which he disagrees hampers effective education. While a
school must be concerned with how chastising such a professor burdens
legitimate debate, it cannot be that academic freedom itself immunizes either
professor from professional censure. 29 Such censure does not in my view serve
debased notions of political correctness, but merely takes seriously the school's
obligation to educate its students.3 0
I argued above that law schools today resemble old-fashioned liberal arts
colleges. The discussion in this section permits some expansion of the earlier
comparison. The old-time college grew from the need to prepare men for a
particular profession, the Protestant ministry. Education retained a strong
moral content, it was not purely vocational or intellectual, and the faculty,
largely without doctorates, preached and lectured to a broader public, providing ethical perspectives on current political controversies, such as slavery and
tariffs. Law schools are heirs to aspects of this tradition. We do not train our
students to be professional scholars, but to be effective and benign counselors
in a fractured society. Our graduates most need an enlargement of analytic
and imaginative resources, a confidence with printed and breathing authorities, and a sophisticated apprehension of the complexity of legal affairs that
can inform judgment or persuade the ignorant. The faculty have much to say
directly to society at large about the relation between current controversies
and the persistent norms of a republic of laws. Law schools need not maintain
3
strictly intellectual self-images to qualify as legitimate academic institutions. 1

M. Clinical Legal Education and Political Neutrality
In this section, I hope to tie together themes raised in earlier sections and
at the same time to consider a particular problem: whether choosing clients to
be represented by law school clinics implicates the academic freedom or
political neutrality of the law school. The focus of my discussion is allegations
in a 1990 study by the Washington Legal Foundation that law school clinics
29. That is, a school might withhold sanction from concern about the "chilling effect" on
legitimate, though controversial, teaching, but not from concern for a right to wield epithets
in class.
30. SeeJ. Peter Byrne, Racial Insults and Free Speech Within the University, 79 Geo. L.J. 399
(1991); see also MarkTushnet, Political Correctness, the Law, and the Legal Academy, 4 Yale
J.L. & Human. 127, 144 (1992).
31. See David Barnhizer, The University Ideal and Clinical Legal Education, 35 N.Y.L. Sch. L.
Rev. 87, 127 (1990). Not surprisingly, professional, including legal, education has played a
large role in the development of higher education. The great flowering of universities in the
Middle Ages occurred in institutions committed to specialized training for positions in
church and State. The first university, at Bologna, was devoted primarily to the study of law.
See 1 Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, rev. ed., eds. F. M.
Powicke & A. B. Emden, 142-203 (Oxford, 1936). Even Oxford developed from intensive,
informal instruction in canon law. See R. W. Southern, From Schools to University, in The
Early Oxford Schools, ed.J. I. Catto, 1, 15-20 (Oxford, 1984).
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serve only left-wing "special interest" groups and indoctrinate their students
with the ideologies of those groups.3 2 After setting out the charges in the
report and evaluating their merit, I discuss more generally the relationship
among clinical legal education, academic freedom, and professional ethical
commitment. Finally, I use the WLF report as a benchmark for evaluating the
virtues of university legal scholarship.
The Washington Legal Foundation is a nonprofit public interest law and
policy center devoted to the advocacy of conservative causes.3 3 WLF surveyed
law schools to develop a picture of public interest activities at the schools,
primarily clinical activities but also such programs as loan-forgiveness funds
and mandatory pro bono work requirements. The WLF report concludes that
faculties use law school clinics and other programs to promote liberal special
interests, such as "environmental overkill" and "consumers iiber alles.' 4 Not
only do clinics serve only liberal causes, but faculties intentionally use them as
a means to indoctrinate "young left-wing idealists, who will fight to implement
the agenda rejected at the ballot box."- WLF specifically charges that an
ideologically committed clinical program, among other faults, breaches the
law school's political neutrality and "adversely impacts on academic freedom"
by deterring students who reject the views advocated by the clinic from
benefiting from clinical education.
My brief summary does not capture the breadth or vehemence of the
charges the report directs at legal education, which is accused of a "broader
'37
practice of politically biased classroom and clinical legal indoctrination.
The report frequently employs hysterical rhetoric that vacillates between fear
and scom. Much that WLF condemns as leftist extremism involves only
attempts to enforce existing laws.ss Nonetheless, the report seizes upon a
theoretical problem that has long divided law professors: the applicability of
traditional concepts of political neutrality and academic freedom to clinical
teaching.3 9

32. In Whose Interest? Public Interest Law Activism in the Law Schools (Washington, 1990)
[hereinafter WLF Report].
33. See Elisabeth Hickey, Storm Troopers of the Right: The Washington Legal Foundation's
Battle, Wash. Times, Aug. 6, 1990, at El.
34. WLF Report, supra note 32, at 1.
35. Id. at ii.
36. Id. at 20.
37. Id. at 58.
38. For example, Paul Craig Roberts claims, 'The absurd legal theories used to justify the
criminal indictment of Exxon [for the Valdez oil spill] were largely conceived by environmental groups that have close ties with law school public interest programs." Introduction, in
WLF Report, supranote 32, at i, ii. Passing the easy use of guilt by "close ties," one might recall
that Exxon was indicted primarily for violations of provisions of the Clean WaterAct that date
to 1972. See 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c) (1988). The view that corporations can be held criminally
liable for the negligent acts of their employees is hardly radical. See Richard A. Posner,
Economic Analysis of Law, 4th ed., 421-22 (Boston, 1992). Both the passage of the Act and
the indictment of Exxon occurred during Republican administrations.
39. See Elizabeth M. Schneider, Political Interference in Law School Clinical Programs: Reflections on Outside Interference and Academic Freedom, 11J.C. & U.L. 179 (1984).
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Some law schools have resisted inaugurating clinical programs because of
concern that they do not fit easily into the more scholarly norms of traditional
legal education. Application of the structure sketched earlier in this article
may help to clarify real concerns. The lurid colors in which the report paints
the political tendencies of clinics may even, paradoxically, simplify our task.
But first it is necessary to trim the allegations down to a plausible compass.
WLF's allegation that clinical education generally pursues partisan political
goals is hopelessly untenable and is contradicted by its own survey, which
found that most clinics serve the mundane needs of indigent people. 40 WLF
also charges that "the activism of the public interest clinics spreads a predisposition against private enterprise to students."41 This hilariously misses the
mark: at most schools more than three-fourths of new graduates begin work at
private law firms and a tiny fraction, almost always less than three percent, go
into public interest or poverty law careers. 4 An ABA study in the mid-1980s
found that the electives most often chosen by law students fell into the
categories of Professional Skills, Taxation, International Law, Commercial
Law, and Business and Finance. 43 Indeed, a persistentjustification for clinical
legal education has been that it provides exposure to the legal needs of the
disadvantaged when the dominant, traditional curriculum emphasizes the
44
legal problems of the wealthy and of business.
It is fair to acknowledge that law school clinics do largely represent people
and interests that often oppose dominant institutions like business and government. There are several explanations for this tendency that fall short of a
conspiracy of fanatical law professors. First, an ABA model student practice
rule and many state bar rules restrict students to representing indigents. 45
Although such a rule has the benign purpose of increasing the supply of
representation for the indigent, it also protects private lawyers from competition from law school clinics. Second, businesses and government already enjoy
excellent professional legal representation; law students in fact cannot compete with experienced lawyers in most cases. Third, clinical education is
expensive; accordingly, many clinics begin on seed money donated by foundations or individuals who have a charitable purpose, such as protecting the
environment.46 Can one imagine a law school declining on political grounds a
contribution to found a clinic that will advise fledgling businesses?
40. WLF Report, supra note 32, at 12.
41. Id. at 2.
42. Bruce S. Stuart & Kim D. Stuart, The Top Law Schools: The Ultimate Guide (New York,
1990).
43. William B. Powers, A Study of Contemporary Law School Curricula 54 (Indianapolis, 1987).
44. See, e.g., Norman Redlich, Clinical Education: Stranger in an Elitist Club, 31J. Legal Educ.

201 (1981).
45. See Report of the Section of'Judicial Administration, 94 Ann. Rep. A.B.A. 240 (1969) (setting
out proposed model rule relative to legal assistance by law students).
46. The shape of clinical education still bears the stamp of the efforts of the Council on Legal
Education for Professional Responsibility, a project of the Ford Foundation. CLEPR provided the funds for the beginnings of many legal clinics, beginning in 1969. Its priority was
for "programs of legal services for those most in need and least able to afford them." CLEPR
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But after one has pruned away much of the hyperbole of the WLF report
and suggested the real context in which the issues must be considered, the fact
remains that there is a tilt to law school clinics. They do represent people and
interests that cannot pay private lawyers. The point can be made concrete by
examining the dispute about the Western Natural Resources Law Clinic at the
-University of Oregon School of Law.
The Oregon timber industry long had objected to the role of the clinic in
bringing litigation to enforce and expand legal limitations against resource
development. The intensity of emotion surrounding lawsuits seeking to prevent logging of old-growth forests increased industry objection, leading the
university to establish a committee to determine whether the clinic was properly part of university legal education.47 The committee's report defended
both the appropriateness of an advocacy clinic as part of a politically neutral
university and the propriety of the conduct of the clinic. 8 The conflict has
unusual interest because both the timber industry's claims and the committee's report focus on the relation between clinical advocacy and institutional neutrality.
Neither the industry's charges, repeated substantially by WLF, nor the
committee's report adequately applies appropriate principles. 9 The clinic's
critics assert that the clinic violated institutional neutrality both because a law
school organization should not take sides on contentious issues and because it
should represent the spectrum of environmental viewpoints. The university
committee report responds by arguing that the clinic need not be neutral
because the university as a whole is, and by denying that the advocacy by the
clinic implies any ideological commitments. Although the timber industry's
arguments are shallow and self-contradictory,-" the university's arguments
Newsl., Jan. 1969, at 26; see generally William Pincus, Clinical Education for Law Students
(New York, 1980).
One might add that many of the early clinical professors came from legal services and
other public interest positions. Barnhizer, supranote 31, at 87 & n.3. Whether this is cause or
effect of the commitment of clinics to the underrepresented need not be resolved. Professor
Barnhizer sees clinical faculty as pushing law schools toward commitments to more substantive and radical notions ofjustice. Id. at 106-10. Currently, clinical faculty seem more often to
present an institutionally conservative influence, insisting on the worth of engagement with
and melioration of existing legal institutions, when many classroom faculty have flown to the
higher branches of theory.
47. See Katherine Bishop, Oregon Law Clinic Battles the Timber Industry, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5,
1988, at B5; Kathleen Monje, UO to Probe Pro-Environment Charge Against Law Clinic, The
Oregonian, Aug. 10, 1988, at 15.
48. Report of the Ad Hoc Study Committee for the Environmental Law Clinic, University of
Oregon School of Law, Nov. 30, 1988, at 11-12 [hereinafter Committee Report].
49. Nor should we be surprised. The timber industry cannot be seen as acting out of concern for
educational principles; it understandably wished to disable a formidable weapon frustrating
its pursuit of perceived economic self-interest. It employed arguments as part of a pressure
campaign upon university officials, the board of education, and the state legislature. The
university, at the same time, needed to fend off this pressure in order to preserve overall
institutional autonomy and prestige.
50. The timber industry arguments lack any coherent idea about the purposes and powers of a
state university. The clinic is criticized sometimes for violating norms appropriate for a state
agency and other times for exceeding the mission of a monastic scriptorium.
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seem lamed by its unwillingness to acknowledge that the clinic purposefully
serves the interests of citizens who wish to use legal means to protect the
environment.
The university sought to avoid addressing the propriety of clinical commitment by emphasizing the practical and ethical circumstances of clinical operation. The clinic selected cases from individuals and groups that requested
representation, and business groups had not approached it; cases were chosen
for their educational value; and ethical norms required the clinic to represent
its clients zealously and to avoid conflicts of interest. All this is true and welltaken. Nonetheless, the incredible implications that the reader is invited to
draw are that the clinic's invariably pro-environment position is an accident
occasioned by the fact that the first clients that happened to solicit help were
pro-environment and that the faculty and students are indifferent to the
political and social implications of their advocacy. Stated baldly, these suggestions ring with the timbre of an aluminum bell. Surely, most of the participants see the clinic as an opportunity to provide free representation to a
worthwhile cause that can be represented only by charitable or public support. The clinic must be sustained by the enthusiasm of faculty and students
for fighting legally for ecological values.
How can this degree of commitment to representing environmental protection groups be harmonized with academic freedom and institutional neutrality? Some commentators have argued that clinical professors' choice of
cases cannot be challenged because the choice itself is protected by the
professor's academic freedom:
[C]linical teachers are-first and foremost-teachers and should be
recognized as such. Selection of individual cases to handle and methods of
handling those cases, like the selection of casebooks and classroom teaching
approaches, lies at the very heart of the educational function of clinical
programs. So long as the decisions made by a clinical teacher reasonably serve
that educational function, a judgment that only the law school faculty is
capable of making, these decisions should be protected by academic freedom.51
This view slights the distinctively valuable character of clinical education and
stretches the idea of academic freedom into an indefensible posture.
Of course, clinical professors make a host of educational judgments about
the scope and methods of their classes that should be protected as fully as are
analogous judgments made by classroom teachers. A clinical professor may
choose to bring social security disability cases because they can be started and
substantially completed within one semester, they present an appropriate
degree of challenge to the student, and the student can represent the claimant at an administrative evidentiary hearing. But managing an environmental
protection clinic or a sex discrimination clinic also consistently devotes resources toward changing the world in a particular direction through advocacy.
Litigation seeks not so much clarification of the law, although that may be a

51. See Schneider, supranote 39, at 190.
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byproduct, as victory.-2 A scholar operates within the world of ideas, even if she
hopes that her writing will lead to social change; a clinician directly participates in legal institutions to achieve outcomes desirable for her clients. Acting
as she does upon society, a clinician cannot expect society to grant her
53
autonomy on the same grounds it does the theoretician.
The clinical teacher does not seek primarily to expand knowledge but to
shape practice into effective and responsible patterns. 4 In the traditional
understanding, the scholar's academic freedom in the classroom derives from
his pursuit of knowledge through professional conventions; academic freedom has not comfortably embraced strictly pedagogical questions, such as
teaching methodology. 5 While the clinical professor's educational judgments
about the structure and procedures of her clinical class should enjoy all the
uncertain protection afforded the traditional law professor's classroom judgments, the decision about what positions to advocate is another step away
from the validating center of scholarly knowledge. The ideological stance of a
clinic may involve political commitments that cannot be justified by a strictly
intellectual understanding of academic freedom.
Let us concede then, at least for purposes of argument, that the political
stance of some law school clinics cannot be defended totally by the many
educational goals and constraints of clinical education or by appeal to scholarly norms of academic freedom. But it does not follow that the political
tendency of clinical education constitutes a reprehensible failure of political
neutrality on the part of the law school. Earlier in the essay, I argued that the
law school's role of preparing students for professional lifejustifies the school's
departure from strictly intellectual commitments, such as by insisting that
ethical issues always be raised in classroom teaching. The ideological shape of
current clinical education seems amply justified by the legal profession's
ethical commitment to representation of those who cannot secure paid representation in the marketplace. 6 However far current practice of lawyers or
52. An example clarifies this point. The Oregon Committee Report responded to the timber
industry's complaint that students receive one-sided impressions of environmental disputes
by emphasizing that students are taught to appreciate the strength of industry arguments in
order to prepare fully for litigation. Litigation and the classroom provide dramatically
different contexts for discussion of competing ideas. Classroom discussion presupposes that
powerful arguments may cause disputants to change their positions. Litigation preparation
seeks to understand an opponent's argument in order to prepare the best strategies and
tactics to maximize your client's advantage in the contest.
53. This distinction is analogous to the speech-conduct distinction within First Amendment law.
See Thomas I. Emerson, The System of Freedom of Expression 79-90 (New York, 1970).
54. Clinical professors, like reflective practitioners, know things about the legal system that may
not be perceptible to strict scholars. They may also convey this knowledge effectively to
students. Law schools should cherish this knowledge, but professional lore lacks the degree
of abstractness and clarity that permits rigorous debate and reformulation.
55. See, e.g., Carley v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 737 P.2d 1099 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1987).
56. American Bar Association, Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 6.1:
A lawyer should render public interest legal service. A lawyer may discharge
this responsibility by providing professional services at no fee or a reduced fee
to persons of limited means or to public service or charitable groups or
organizations, by service in activities for improving the law, the legal system or
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explicit disciplinary strictures fall short, there can be no doubt that representation without regard to wealth constitutes a bedrock of the profession's view
of its obligations to society. The law school need not be neutral about this
value any more than the English Department need be neutral about the value
of reading poetry.
The law school clinic's representation of those who cannot secure paid
lawyers substantiates this professional ethical norm in several ways. First, and
perhaps least important, it devotes the school's own meager resources toward
expansion of representation, ameliorating fractionally the unequal distribution of representation in society. Second, the school thereby holds up the
value of free representation to the student and to the profession as a valid
commitment. Third, it permits the student to experience the reality of pro
bono representation, demystifying the practice and facilitating the student's
performance of free representation as part of professional life. This effort
seems to me to be precisely the kind of responsible preparation for practice
that justifies the existence of university professional schools.
Someone might approach a law school faculty with a proposal to donate
funds to establish a clinic to advocate the interests of people with annual
incomes over $10 million, such as by defending spendthrift trusts or lobbying
for a reduction in the capital gains tax. Even if the proposal satisfied all stated
educational qualifications, most of us would reject the proposal with disgust,
even if we personally supported the specific positions the clinic would advocate. The proposal mocks the public service aspirations of the bar, while
reinforcing the imbalance of legal resources devoted to protecting the rich
and established. Such a clinic would not broaden the student lawyer's sympathies or nurture ethical aspirations above the incentives of the marketplace.
Both opponents and defenders of clinics sometimes conceive of neutrality
as a balance of competing ideologies. The WLF urges that the current liberal
slant of clinics be cured by the institution of conservative clinics. Similarly, the
University of Oregon committee argued that any committed advocacy by the
clinic was offset by other points of view advanced by other committed programs and individuals within the university, creating a broad "freedom of both
students and professors to be non-neutral within the framework of overall
institutional neutrality."57 While such political balance may be desirable educationally and necessary for both the internal and external political life of the
institution, it is different from institutional neutrality. The university is not
primarily a Keynesian manager of the marketplace of ideas. The university
must be neutral toward the speech of its members because the members are
presumed to know more about their subject than university administrators or
regents and to be generating political heat as a byproduct of scholarly light.
Committed advocacy does not partake of the scholarly detachment that instithe legal profession, and by financial support for organizations that provide
legal services to persons of limited means.
See also Lewis F. Powell, The Response of the Bar, 51 A.B.A. J. 751 (1965) (explaining
support of the organized bar for federal funding of legal services to the poor).
57. Committee Report, supra note 48, at 11.
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tutional neutrality was conceived to protect. Social commitments by professional schools derogate from the premises of institutional autonomy, but can
be justified by the obligation of the school to nourish the normative basis of
the profession.
The law school's articulation and teaching of professional ideals stands on
a different footing from illegitimate commitments by academic departments
to rank political preferences. They arise directly from the structure of its
educational mission, its anchor in the needs of the legal profession as a whole.
These are ethical precepts that lawyers hold as lawyers, that are not controversial within the bar's internal conversations, and that may often have little
resonance with the individual's personal political preferences. Moreover, as
noted at the end of Part II, although these professional precepts should not be
impugned lightly, they are always subject to serious criticism and revision.
They are troublesome, but indispensable.
Having emphasized to this degree the domesticity of nonintellectual values
within a law school, I wish to conclude by emphasizing the value of the
intellectual standards of legal scholarship that pull it away from unbridled
political advocacy. The worth of this enterprise can be manifested by noting
the deplorable intellectual quality of the WLF report itself. This is not inappropriate, because the report is directed, at least formally, at legal educators
and presumes to hold their performance to account. That there are several
failings in the report rarely found within the standard discourses of legal
scholarship may invite derision, but their nature may suggest the ways that
even the weak disciplinary restraints of legal scholarship promote respect for
the truth.
It would be tedious to detail the many failings of the WLF report as one
might the first draft of a student paper. It repeatedly insults its subjects, it
presents freestanding prejudices as conclusions based on survey evidence, it
conflates categories, ignores the wider context of the issues it discusses, uses
irrelevant evidence, invokes guilt by association, and consistently ignores
evidence that contradicts its presuppositions. But the trouble goes much
deeper. The report betrays no curiosity about the programs it criticizes; all is
confident invocation of unquestioned predilection never exposed to examination. Rather than elucidate a problem, it erects a bogey at which it can
sneer. The report does not invite discussion, but seeks to silence disagreement
by rhetorical intimidation. Because it assumes that its readers are as meanspirited as its authors, it makes no attempt to persuade their rational faculties,
but rather seeks to excite the passions of those who already share its views by
relentlessly belittling others. In short, the authors of the report have no belief
in the efficacy of learning or discussion, but view words and numbers as
weapons in a relentless struggle among competing interests.
The report is a pure specimen of political speech, against which the virtues
of scholarship stand in relief. The conventions of scholarship exist to promote
communal discussion of valuable questions, the presentation of evidence and
argument in a form that invites response, clarification, and correction. However deep the political commitments of the individual writer, these conventions force disclosure and reconsideration. They bring participants to a more
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rounded understanding of an issue, its provenance and entanglements. This
sharing of the relevant evidence and the range of arguments we accept as
learning. However imperfect its philosophical foundations, however uncertain its transcendental value, however manipulable its products, abandoning
its nurture and homage for the more visceral throb of political speech will
deprive us of the hope that reason and reflection can lead us to a legal system
and a society more just, efficient, and lovely.
IV. Conclusion
Political neutrality does not require the tower or the veil, but a commitment to honest discussion on the basis of reason and evidence, in which
participants assume the risk of changing their minds. This commitment
implies a commitment to truth beyond position or interest. Though law
professors resist the equation of methodological criteria with the tests of truth,
they do adhere to mores of discourse that signal their commitment. The
absence of methodological consensus creates risks for prejudice and political
persecution; awareness of these risks lessens them.
But our lack of method also frees us to acquaint ourselves with a world of
learning. We act as intermediaries between thought and power, interpreting
and applying several intellectual traditions to the dilemmas of the legal system
and toward the edification of the intelligent and ambitious (but not intellectual). An account of academic freedom for law schools that ignores our
professional obligations must become either a platitude or a denial of responsibility. We do not breach necessary political neutrality when we proclaim that
lawyers are pests if they do not enhance the justice and well-being of the
society that they serve.
Education that prepares people for useful action must be humanistic.
Lawyers exercise fine judgment under stress in a world of uncertainty and
paradox. We may lament that law is the least scientific of the social sciences or
rejoice that we can offer the most humanistic of graduate educations, which
joins the general study of social thought to training in the tools by which it can
be used. We need to live up to our promise.

